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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Kwan Ho Wu petitions for review of two orders of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA), which denied two separate motions to reopen exclusion proceedings.  We 
will grant the petition, vacate the BIA’s orders, and remand to the BIA for further 
proceedings. 
I 
 Because we write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, we recite 
only the essential facts and procedural history. 
 Wu entered the United States in 1992 and was placed in exclusion proceedings.  In 
1994, an Immigration Judge (IJ) found that Wu had not made the requisite showing to 
warrant asylum or withholding of deportation, and ordered his deportation.  The BIA 
dismissed Wu’s appeal in 2000.  Seven years later, Wu filed a motion to reopen exclusion 
proceedings based on ineffective assistance of counsel.  The BIA denied the motion 
because it was filed out of time and the time to file could not be equitably tolled. 
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 On October 15, 2010, Wu filed a second motion to reopen, this time alleging 
changed conditions in China.  Wu, who has fathered four children since entering the 
United States, argued that “a recent increase in forced . . . sterilization procedures in 
China” constituted “changed country conditions,” thereby excusing his breach of the time 
and numerical limitations on motions to reopen.  Appended to Wu’s motion was evidence 
that he would submit at a hearing before an IJ if his case were reopened.  On November 
16, 2010, the BIA denied the motion, and Wu timely filed a petition for review. 
 On December 16, 2010, Wu filed a third motion to reopen, which also sought 
reconsideration of the denial of his second motion to reopen.  He again argued changed 
country conditions because of enhanced enforcement of China’s family planning policy 
and attached additional evidence to his motion in support of that claim.  The BIA denied 
the motion on March 2, 2011.1
II 
  Wu timely petitioned for review, and we consolidated his 
two appeals. 
 We review de novo the BIA’s conclusions of law.  Prestol Espinal v. Att’y Gen., 
653 F.3d 213, 215 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Patel v. Att’y Gen., 599 F.3d 295, 297 (3d Cir. 
2010)).  In general, 
a party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion 
proceedings (whether before the Board or the Immigration Judge) and that 
                                                 
 1 Because Wu petitioned for review of the BIA’s decision on his second motion to 
reopen, we need not consider whether the BIA’s denial of the motion for reconsideration 
of the denial of that motion was proper. 
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motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final 
administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be 
reopened. 
 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  These limitations are subject to the following exception, which 
Wu has invoked in this case: 
The . . . limitations . . . shall not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings 
. . . [t]o apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on 
changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the 
country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material 
and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at 
the previous hearing . . . . 
 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).  We have explained that 
the BIA’s point of reference when evaluating whether country conditions have changed, 
or whether the evidence proffered was previously unavailable, is the time of the hearing 
before the IJ.  Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 252–54 (3d Cir. 2006).  This holds true, as 
is evident from the regulation’s numerical limitation, even where the applicant has 
already filed a motion to reopen.  Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
 The BIA decisions under review evidenced a misunderstanding of this rule of law.  
After citing some of the evidence submitted with Wu’s second motion—including 
affidavits from two Chinese nationals claiming that they were forcibly sterilized because 
they fathered children abroad and a purportedly official village document indicating all 
men with two offspring “are targeted for sterilization”—the 2010 decision stated: “The 
applicant has not indicated why he waited until now to file this document, and he has also 
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failed to demonstrate how conditions in China have changed since his last motion in 2007 
. . . .”  The BIA then dismissed a 2009 congressional report suggesting that Wu will be 
required to register his children upon return to China, because “this document, too, fails 
to present evidence that country conditions have changed since the applicant’s last 
motion in 2007.” 
 Although it is less clear that the BIA’s 2011 decision also applied the incorrect 
legal standard, we are concerned that it did so.  The 2011 decision listed Wu’s submitted 
evidence by date, noting that all of the documents were produced between 2001 and 
2009.  But the BIA then asserted that “[m]ost of the evidence is not new nor previously 
unavailable” despite the fact that the hearing before the IJ took place in 1993 and 1994.  
While the 2011 decision found that what “[t]he evidence indicates” is insufficient to meet 
the burden of showing changed circumstances, it is unclear whether the BIA considered 
all of the evidence before it or only that evidence which it viewed as timely submitted 
under the incorrect legal standard. 
 In light of the foregoing, we are unable to determine whether the BIA abused its 
discretion.  See Abulashvili v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2011) (reviewing the 
denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion).  The BIA’s decisions must allow us 
to “‘discern its reasons for declining to afford relief.’”  Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 
268 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006)).  Compare 
id. at 268–71 (holding the BIA’s analysis insufficient to support its decisions), with Liu v. 
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Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 148–50 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding the BIA’s analysis adequate).  
Although it is possible the BIA considered all the evidence, its reliance on an erroneous 
legal premise in the context of its written decisions casts doubt upon whether it fulfilled 
its “‘duty to explicitly consider any country conditions evidence submitted by [the] 
applicant that materially bears on his claim.’”  Zheng, 549 F.3d at 268 (quoting Guo v. 
Gonzales, 463 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 2006)).  Therefore, remand is necessary so the BIA 
may weigh all of the evidence Wu submitted with his second and third motions to reopen 
under the correct legal standard as provided in Filja. 
III 
 For the aforementioned reasons, we will grant Wu’s petition, vacate the BIA’s 
orders, and remand the matter to the BIA for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
